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This contribution is conceived as a resource on the state of European populist parties before the 
outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. It reports on cross-national comparative findings generated by 
data collected from 30 European countries as to the state of populist parties in one calendar year (2019) 
and provides an extensive qualitative overview of the national cases. The article shows that while populist 
parties are preponderantly on the right, there is a significant degree of ideological variation among 
European populism. The data shows significant diversity in their electoral performance but also that 
populist party participation in government is no longer a marginal phenomenon. The article ultimately 
elaborates on the various types of positions on European integration – from soft/hard Euroscepticism to 
lack thereof – and discusses the implications of their affiliation in the European Parliament.  
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The holy grail for many comparative scholars has been a definitive list of which parties conform to the 
definition of populism. This quest has been largely driven by the quantitative and electoral growth of 
European populist parties, their increasing impact on politics and participation in national 
governments and in the European Union (EU), and by interest in their Eurosceptic agendas. Despite 
their increased prominence, it is notable that works which offered comprehensive lists were more 
frequent when such parties were rarer and more marginal (Ignazi 1992; Taggart 1995; Betz 1994). In 
more recent years, such efforts have been somewhat less common (but see Mudde 2007; Minkenberg 
2011; van Kessel 2015).  
 
Lately this gap has been filled by ‘The PopuList’ (Rooduijn et al. 2019), which has aimed to pool 
research expertise to provide an authoritative listing of populist, far right, far left, and Eurosceptic 
parties across Europe. The PopuList is an international scholarly project that has used expert 
judgements by over 80 academics across a range of countries to assess which parties could be 
considered populist. It has aimed to be comprehensive and to cover all parties that have gained at 
least one seat or 2% of the vote in general elections since 1989, moving a first step towards their 
assessment over time. The project has ultimately provided a nominal classification allowing for the 
production of a dataset that can then be applied in a quantitative manner. The PopuList draws on the 
ideational approach to defining populism (Mudde 2017) – seeing populism as having a core set of 
ideas emphasising ‘the people’ and considering it the linchpin of any rightful political goal and 
decision; criticising ‘the elite’; and capitalising on a sense of (real or perceived) crisis (Taggart 2000; 
Mudde 2004; Rooduijn 2014), rather than as a strategic phenomenon or one that is fundamentally 
malleable (Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017; Hawkins et al. 2018). 
 
The collaborative research effort of The PopuList has taken place amid increasing interest in the 
measurement of party-based populism (Polk et al. 2017; Engler et al. 2019; Meijers and Zaslove 
2021; Norris 2020).
1
 A growing number of expert survey projects have been concerned with 
measuring the degree of populism and its latent aspects. With the 2014 wave, the Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey (CHES) started measuring parties’ anti-elitism and anti-corruption salience (Polk et al. 2017) – 
i.e. some of the dimensions subsumed under the concept of populism (Mudde 2004). In the 
following wave, the CHES team expanded the list of questions so as to account for party positions on 
‘people-centredness’, with which experts were asked to locate parties on a ‘direct vs. representative 
democracy’ dimension. The Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey (POPPA) has tried to 
unpack populism further as a concept ‘constituted by multiple related but distinct dimensions’ 
(Meijers and Zaslove 2021: 373), arguing that measures should also consider the issues advanced by 
individual parties and, thus, address the constitutive ideological elements of their populism. Sitting 
somewhere between the broad-ranging scope of CHES and the specialist focus of POPPA, the 
Global Party Survey ambitiously sought to combine several aspects and capture party policy positions 
and their populism across the globe (Norris 2020). These studies are clearly contributing to the 
development of quantitative measures of party-based populism. 
 
David Art (2020) has recently written about the over-use of populism and provides a powerful critique 
of some of the trends towards generalisation. His argument is that what is currently characterised a 
populist wave is better viewed as nativism and is linked to immigration politics. The emergence of left-
 
1
 Yet another strategy, propounded by Kirk Hawkins (2009), had been concerned with measuring the populist discourse 
of individual leaders across countries. 
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wing populism in Europe has, he argues, waned and support for other populists seems rooted in 
nativism and authoritarianism. However, we suggest that there is nothing exclusive about identifying 
parties as populist and, given the thin-centred nature of populism, it is indeed often useful to analyse 
populist parties under different categorisations.   
 
Our contribution adopts The PopuList’s crisp logic to classification and focuses in depth on the 
ideology, electoral performance, and participation in government of populist parties in Europe. The 
aspiration here is to link the data presented on parties identified as populist to their national context 
through substantial qualitative assessments (see Appendix) and present a comparative overview 
spanning different aspects. We conceive of our data as a resource on the state of European populist 
parties before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which complements and expands upon The 
PopuList in two major respects: differentiation and description. In our contribution, we hold time 
constant and look at only one year (2019) to allow a standardised cross-country comparison across 
various dimensions. In terms of the ideology of these parties, this allows us to expand the ideological 
range used by The PopuList (far left, far right, or neither of the two) to include other positions along 
the left-right axis.
2
 From the ideational perspective to which our work subscribes (Mudde 2017), we 
thus respond to the mounting concerns on the obfuscation of populism’s ‘ideological companions’ 
(Art 2020). By looking at the whole set of populist parties in Europe and unpacking their ideological 
features, we explicitly acknowledge the role exerted, for example, by nativism (Mudde 2007), 
democratic socialism (March 2011), or reformism (Hanley and Sikk 2016) in their agendas. We also 
further differentiate the monolithic category of Euroscepticism used by The PopuList to distinguish 
between various stances on the EU and European integration. In order to offer some sort of measure 
of relative importance, we report on national electoral performances in 2019 or in the year most 
closely prior to 2019. We report any participation in national governments that took place in 2019. 
We also look, for EU member states, at the electoral performance of populist parties in the 2019 
European Parliament (EP) election and the group affiliation for those parties that secured MEPs. A 
further significant way in which we complement existing knowledge is by providing qualitative country 
descriptions of the state of populist parties in 30 European countries – i.e., the 27 EU member states 
plus Norway, Switzerland, and the UK (see Appendix). 
 
The motivation behind our endeavour is that no study of active political parties can aspire to be 
conclusive: parties do change their stances over time and adapt to circumstances – and this surely 
holds for chameleonic entities like populist parties (Taggart 2000). Hence, this overview is not 
concerned, at this stage, with outlining longitudinal trends, but is designed as a synchronous 
comparative exercise and a resource. We focus on 2019 because this was the most recent complete 
calendar year at the time of our research, and provides a ready empirical application of The 
PopuList, which was also released the same year. It was also the year of the latest EP election, which 
is a useful electoral benchmark for the performance of these parties. With hindsight, 2019 might turn 
out to be a high point for European populism. Amid the fundamental challenges arising from the 
COVID-19 pandemic, it now remains to be seen whether and how national electorates will reward 
populist parties for their responses to the crisis. In the following section, we briefly outline the 
rationale guiding our classification strategy and the different dimensions underlying it. 
 
2
 We recognise that the left-right ideological dimension may not be exhaustive in terms of how we can characterise these 
parties (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2006; Norris and Inglehart 2019). However, for our purposes of examining ideological diversity, 




Differentiating among European populist parties 
 
The primary focus of our study is on EU member states, but we have also included Norway, 
Switzerland, and the UK. The data for this contribution focuses on a number of issues – the 
ideological placement of the parties, their performance in European Parliament election in 2019 
(where relevant) and most recent national elections, their participation in government, and (where 
relevant) the parties’ EP affiliations. Our research draws on our own reading of programmatic 
documents, the media coverage, and the secondary literature about populist parties.  
 
We treat populism as an ideology or set of ideas and start with the presumption that it is possible to 
operate a first distinction between populist and non-populist parties (van Kessel 2015). There have 
been recent attempts to gauge party-based populism (Meijers and Zaslove 2021; Norris 2020), but 
before considering as a matter of degree how populist parties are, we feel there is value in identifying 
which parties qualify as populist. The PopuList (Rooduijn et al. 2019) moved an important step in 
this direction subscribing to a crisp logic, but it is somewhat less sensitive to party change over time. 
Our decision to focus on one single year responds to this concern and presents a classification of 
parties for the year 2019. This is essentially why we feel compelled to define membership to the 
populist set. In our classification, we attempted to include all populist parties which have either 
contested the last national elections or ran in the EP in 2019 (where appropriate) returning at least 2% 
of the vote or one seat either at the national or supranational level, with a broad aspiration to meet 
Sartori’s criteria of relevance (1976: 121-123). Doing this, we can identify 63 European parties that 




After identifying populist parties, we locate them along the ideological left-right continuum. We cover 
the whole spectrum from radical left to radical right, including moderate right, centre, and moderate 
left positions in between. The meaning of this distinction is based on an overarching notion of 
equality (Bobbio 1997), whereby the radical left can be interpreted as the most inclusionary and 
egalitarian and the radical right as the least egalitarian and most exclusionary. The extreme poles of 
this continuum broadly correspond to the endorsement of democratic socialism (radical left, as per 
March 2011) and nativism and authoritarianism (radical right, as per Mudde 2007). Further 
differentiations in between are articulated in more detail in the qualitative part of this study 
(Appendix) and rest on whether parties embody social-democratic values (moderate left), social 
conservatism and/or economic liberalism (moderate right), or centrist reformism (centre).  
 
3
 Our classification extensively validates the classification of active/represented parties offered by The PopuList (Rooduijn 
et al. 2019). There are some cases where we do not classify a party as populist which The PopuList does classify in this 
way and these are: Bridge of Independent Lists (Most) in Croatia, Sinn Féin in Ireland (which we feel should be classified 
the same way in the UK as it is the same party), and Italian Left (SI) in Italy. Most is essentially a centrist anti-
establishment party (Grbeša and Šalaj 2017). Sinn Féin presents itself as a republican left party and is best categorised as 
‘policy-seeking’ (Mainwairing and McGraw 2019). SI has joined a radical left electoral ticket (The Left) in 2019, but while 
the new coalition revealed some populist elements in its EP manifesto, there were no evident traces of populism in SI’s 
own programmatic documents to justify inclusion in our list. We additionally classify the following parties as populist 
which are not included in The PopuList: National Alliance in Latvia (Braghiroli and Petsinis 2019) and the Brexit Party in 
the UK (the single-issue populist project by former UK Independence Party leader, Nigel Farage). We finally treat the 
Hungarian Fidesz and its satellite party, the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), as one single entity (Pirro 
2015). See national cases in Appendix for further details. 
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The other ideological aspect we consider is the party stance on European integration. While The 
PopuList does identify whether the parties are broadly Eurosceptic, much of the literature on party-
based Euroscepticism argues for differentiating between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism where the 
‘hard’ classification means advocating non-membership of the EU. There is, as yet, no 
comprehensive classification of what type of Euroscepticism populist parties hold (if any), so we have 
offered this classification in the data. We essentially determine whether the party falls into the 
Eurosceptic category, and then distinguish between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Eurosceptic positions (Szczerbiak 
and Taggart 2008) based on the stances elaborated in their most recent manifestos or their official 
websites and the secondary literature. 
 
In order to facilitate comparisons between the relative importance of the parties in their national party 
systems, we report both on the performance in 2019 national elections (or most recent election prior 
to 2019) and in the 2019 EP election. We then look into any government participation in 2019. 
These two aspects resonate with the steady electoral growth of right-wing populist parties across 
Europe (Halikiopoulou 2018; Bernhard and Kriesi 2019) and the overall influence exerted while 
sitting in government (Pirro 2015; Akkerman et al. 2016; Wolinetz and Zaslove 2018). Finally, we 
report on the political group affiliation within the EP to monitor the latest developments at the level 
of supranational party group membership, which is part of a broader concern with shifting alliances 
and influence at the EU level (McDonnell and Werner 2019). Looking across the data generated we 
can make some broad-based comparison across the range of cases. 
 
 
A comparative overview of contemporary European populist parties 
 
Table 1 summarises the data presented so far. An extensive qualitative overview of the 30 national 
cases is supplied in the Appendix. The overall picture we get is one of variance. The table lists the 
parties and provides a measure of their electoral relevance with their result in the most recent national 
elections (either in or before 2019), their national vote share in the 2019 European Parliament 
election (for EU member states) as well as their party group affiliation in the EP (where relevant). We 
also provide a characterisation of their position on European integration under the ‘Euroscepticism’ 
column where we classify them as either hard or soft Eurosceptic (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008), or as 
not Eurosceptic or as holding an ambiguous position.  
 
Looking at the table overall, we can make some comparative observations about the state of populist 
parties in Europe before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The first observation we can 
make is that populist parties are by no means a unified phenomenon and there is diversity among 
those parties that fit into the category. This means that we need to be careful about not 
overgeneralising about populism in contemporary Europe or conflating populism and right-wing 
politics (Art 2020). Such variance can be seen in a number of different ways. In terms of ideological 
diversity, while there is an electoral preponderance of parties in the radical right (with 40 out of 63 
parties), there are parties distributed across the whole left-right spectrum, including radical left parties, 
centre parties, and parties of the moderate left and right (Table 1). The last decade has seen the 
emergence and consolidation of a number of populist left parties (Katsambekis and Kioupkiolis 
2019). Some of them rose to prominence in response to the austerity measures implemented after the 
 6 
breakout of the Eurozone crisis (della Porta et al. 2017) and cast doubt on the interpretation of 
European populism as the chief preserve of ‘exclusionary’ actors (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 
2013). Notable populist left parties like the Greek SYRIZA or the Spanish Podemos have become 
significant players in their party systems. 
 
 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
 
The populist right (i.e. radical and moderate) is, on average, electorally dominant among European 
populist parties. Three quarters of electoral gains by populists went to parties of the radical and 
moderate right (Figure 1), further qualifying the electoral gains of the right across the past two decades 
(Lewis et al. 2018). With the exception of SYRIZA and the Slovak Smer-SD – which were 
incidentally also governing forces in 2019 – the populist left has not made anything like the same 
electoral inroads of the populist right into national party systems. 
 
 
<FIGURE 1 HERE> 
 
 
The overall diversity of European populism is probably best exemplified by Figure 2 which shows, 
where countries are EU members, the relative electoral weight of party groups in the 2019 EP 
election. Even here we can see a high degree of variation. This diversity should not surprise us as 
populism is a thin-centred ideology that attaches to other ideologies. But it is important that, despite 
the slight electoral prevalence and broad ideological homogeneity of the nativist Identity and 
Democracy (ID) group, we do not mistake populism in contemporary Europe with being an 
exclusively radical right phenomenon, or attribute a necessary correspondence between the 
ideological orientation of the party and group affiliation in the EP. As a case in point, the gains of the 
populist radical right are almost evenly split between the ID group and the European Conservatives 
and Reformists (ECR). Within the radical right subset, we then find the Hungarian Fidesz-KDNP and 
Slovenian Democratic Party sitting together with other moderate right and pro-EU forces as part of 
the European People’s Party (EPP). Fidesz’s group membership was however suspended in March 
2019, showing the EPP’s half-hearted efforts to deal with an enfant terrible in its midst. Finally, and 
with the sole exception of the Slovak Smer-SD (Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, 
S&D), all major populist parties of the left are members of the European United Left/Nordic Green 
Left (GUE/NGL) group. This overview suggests that international/supranational affiliations might still 
serve poorly as ideological proxies (Mair and Mudde 1998). 
 
 
<FIGURE 2 HERE> 
 
 
The 2019 EP election was widely anticipated as a test for further electoral growth and coalition 
building among populist radical right parties (Erlanger 2019). While the populist radical right did 
indeed gain some ground (but not as much as predicted), it did not end up coalescing under a single 
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EP group banner. Nonetheless, populists’ actions and alliances at the supranational level are 
becoming ever more visible (McDonnell and Werner 2019) and we can see a higher degree of 
convergence and cooperation, at least within the ID group. Besides pragmatic considerations on the 
access to resources granted by group membership, it may be that the traditional concerns defining far-
right politics in Eastern and Western Europe (Pirro 2015) have been equalised by the politicisation of 
immigration across the whole continent after the European ‘migrant crisis’ of 2015. If anything, the 
populist radical right may be rallying around the ID flag on the basis of a common ideological 
denominator now comprising not only Euroscepticism, but also opposition to immigration. 
 
Looking at the geographical distribution of party-based populism and its cumulative performance in 
last national elections (Figure 3), there appears to be some regional diversity: populist parties do very 
well in Central and East European countries. There is a clear set of cases that stand out as having 
comparatively high support for populist parties that amounts to over 30% of the vote. Of these nine 
countries, all but three (Italy, Greece, and France) are in Central and Eastern Europe. Populist parties 
single-handedly or cumulatively scored over 40% of the vote in national elections in Bulgaria, 
Czechia, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia; in Hungary, two right-wing populist parties (Fidesz-KDNP 
and Jobbik) captured two-thirds of the national vote share in 2018. The converse is not however true; 
those countries with comparatively low levels of support for populist parties are not mainly from any 
part of Europe as the eight countries with under 10% support are from Southern, Central and 
Eastern, and Western Europe.  
 
 
<FIGURE 3 HERE> 
 
 
Considering the performance of the populist parties and examining a crude measure of whether they 
are moving into the ‘mainstream’ we can look at the figures for how many of the parties had some 
sort of government role in 2019. It is remarkable that 23 of the 63 populist parties were in 
government in 2019. Of course, there are some real differences between the governmental 
experiences of these parties. There are parties like Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland and Fidesz-KDNP 
in Hungary that are essentially majority parties of government, and there are populist coalitions such 
the League and the 5 Star Movement in Italy (Conte I Cabinet: June 2018-September 2019), but most 
of the remaining cases are coalition partners with a variation of importance within the governing 
coalition. What is really significant is that over one-third of European populist parties were in 
government at some point in 2019. 
 
Looking at these parties’ role in public office, Cas Mudde (2013: 4) concluded that: ‘All in all, 
populist radical right government participation remains a rarity in Western Europe’. Although this is a 
subset of our sample, it seems fair to note from our data that the situation has changed in recent 
years. The fact that a significant proportion of contemporary populists have had experience of 
government is confirmation of the trend that European populist parties have moved from being 
insurgent parties to being potential and existing parties of government (Albertazzi and Mueller 2013; 
Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015; Pirro 2015; Akkerman et al. 2016; Wolinetz and Zalsove 2018). 
While populist parties are still in many cases insurgent anti-establishment parties, a significant number 
of them have eventually moved into being a part of the establishment. 
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The final overall comment we can make about populist parties in 2019 concerns the position of these 
parties on European integration. In terms of party-based attitudes on the EU, there is no one-to-one 
correspondence between populism and Euroscepticism (Pirro and Taggart 2018; Rooduijn and van 
Kessel 2019), and our extensive survey goes a long way corroborating it. We can observe that, just as 
populism is a diverse category, so there are important differences between types of Euroscepticism. 
The distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism, which we have applied here, differentiates 
between those parties whose hostility to European integration is such that they want their states to 
leave (or not join) the EU and those soft Eurosceptics that are hostile to European integration/EU but 
stop short of eschewing membership (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008). Soft Euroscepticism is far more 
prevalent than hard Euroscepticism among our populist parties, with 38 soft-Eurosceptic and 14 hard-
Eurosceptic parties – almost half of which hailing from countries that are not, or are no longer, EU 
member states (Table 1). This fits with other findings concerning the 2019 EP elections which show 
that, of all parties expressing Euroscepticism, hard Euroscepticism is very rare (Taggart 2019). 
 
Not all of the populist parties are Eurosceptic. 11 populist parties endorse EU membership and the 
process of European integration, and all but one of these (Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia) are from 
Central and Eastern Europe. Pro-EU populist parties managed to attract, on average, roughly one-
fourth of the populist vote in recent national elections, meaning that a positive stance on the EU is far 
from incompatible with populism and not at all marginal, electorally speaking. Figure 4 shows this in 
terms of relative electoral strength for populist parties in the latest national elections. 
 
Only one party, the Progress Party in Norway, has taken an outright ambiguous position on European 
integration. While populist parties’ stances on ‘Europe’ have wavered in the face of the multiple crises 
(Pirro and van Kessel 2017, 2018) elusive positions are becoming more and more common – and 
clearly so among the populist radical right. Looking at the Freedom Party (Austria) and League (Italy), 
Heinisch et al. (2020) have argued that these parties best fit a third category of ‘equivocal 
Euroscepticism’, which collapses the binary nature of hard and soft Euroscepticism. In a similar way, 
Hloušek and Kaniok (2020) argue that soft Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe in the 
2019 EP elections blended into support for the EU. All in all, it is clear that there is preponderance 
of soft Euroscepticism among European populist parties in 2019, but there is also a range of other 
positions on the issue of European integration and that we should be careful not to simply equate 
European populism with Euroscepticism.  
 
 






Europe has generally witnessed a growing tide of support for populist parties in recent years. By 
building on recent classifications and by freezing the timeframe of analysis, we were able to provide a 
clear snapshot of the nature, strength, and impact of populist parties in 30 European countries. There 
have always been significant variations in the fortunes of populist parties across the continent, but now 
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they are almost ubiquitous and increasingly important to many of their respective party systems and 
institutions of supranational governance. There is therefore a temptation to generalise across the 
cases. We have shown however that populist parties are relatively diverse in terms of ideology, 
electoral performance, supranational affiliation, and attitudes to European integration. 
 
Taken together, populist parties are a telling indicator of wider changes in contemporary European 
politics. But taking them apart, the picture is one with a degree of diversity and means that we need to 
be careful about overgeneralising about European populism. The economic, financial, and migration 
crises as well as Brexit have played a clear role, albeit in different ways, in providing issues, sources of 
mobilisation, and ready constituencies for these parties in the period before 2019. Looking forward to 
the reaction of populist parties to the COVID-19 pandemic, along with the changing form of 
European politics, means we should expect diverse responses, and not be seeking to predict a single 
outcome for populist parties in Europe. 
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Austria has long had a populist radical right party in the Freedom Party (FPÖ), which has already 
been in government as part of a coalition between 2000 and 2005. In 2019, the party was once again 
in coalition with the People’s Party (ÖVP) – an agreement that was reached after the 2017 election. 
The Freedom Party was led by Heinz-Christian Strache and has established itself as a party focused 
on defending Austrian identity, and with an anti-immigration and soft-Eurosceptic position. In the 
2019 EP election, the party managed 17.2% of the vote and joined the Identity and Democracy 
group. In May 2019, a scandal involving Strache being secretly filmed soliciting funds in return for 
committing to censor the media led to the collapse of the coalition government. Strache left the party 
leadership shortly after. As a result of the government collapse, new elections were held in September 
2019 with the Freedom Party gaining 16.2% of the vote. The People’s Party this time formed an 
unprecedented coalition with the Greens. In October Strache resigned from the Freedom Party; the 





Flemish Interest (VB) is a populist radical right party looking to represent Flemish nationalism, 
seeking secession from Belgium. Flemish Interest opposes multiculturalism and is soft Eurosceptic. 
The party achieved 12% in the 2019 national election (with 18.5% in Flanders) and 12.1% in the 2019 
EP election. The party is member of the Identity and Democracy group in the EP. 2019 was a good 
year for the party as its electoral success challenged the cordon sanitaire that the major parties have 
traditionally held against any cooperation with it. This meant that, after the election, leader Tom van 
Grieken was invited to meet the King, which was unprecedented. Government coalition formation 






Populism is a central feature of Bulgarian politics. In 2019, there were five relevant populist parties in 
the country. The first and most important is the moderate right Citizens for European Development 
of Bulgaria (GERB), which has led coalition governments since 2014. The party headed by Prime 
Minister Boyko Borisov is a conservative and pro-EU force that gained 31.1% of the vote in the 2019 
EP election. The party is member of the European People’s Party. In the aftermath of the 2017 
general election, GERB formed a coalition with the United Patriots (OP), an electoral alliance 
comprising a number of radical right and Eurosceptic parties: Ataka (‘Attack’), the National Front for 
the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB), and the Bulgarian National Movement (VMRO).
4
 Ataka was ousted 
from United Patriots in July 2019 and is no longer part of the government coalition. Ataka combines 
 
4
 Of all members of the OP coalition, The PopuList (Rooduijn et al. 2019) includes only the NFSB among those 
represented in parliament. 
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a radical right anti-establishment agenda with hard Euroscepticism and a pro-Russia stance (Pirro 
2015). It is led by Volen Siderov and it campaigns on the slogan ‘To get Bulgaria back’ arguing that 
the Bulgarian establishment is in cahoots with the EU and the US. In the last EP election, Ataka only 
attained 1.1% of the vote. The radical right National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria was 
established by Valery Simeonov as a breakaway from Ataka in 2011. It is an anti-establishment, anti-
immigrant, and anti-minority party, and has a soft-Eurosceptic stance. It endorses government 
spending and is protectionist in terms of Bulgarian business. It attained 1.2% of the vote in the 2019 
EP election. VMRO, the longest living radical right party in post-communist Bulgaria, is an anti-
establishment party that was originally founded to represent the Bulgarian diaspora. The party, led by 
two-times presidential candidate Krasimir Karakachanov, takes an anti-minority and anti-immigrant 
position, and argues for the protection of Bulgarian culture and society with its slogan ‘We defend 
Bulgaria’. The party gained 7.4% of the vote in the 2019 EP election and is member of the European 
Conservatives and Reformists group. Finally, Volya (‘Will’) is a radical right anti-establishment party 
led by Veselin Mareshki, who suggests that he could run the country like a business and is critical of 
established politicians for their incompetence and corruption. The party has a soft-Eurosceptic 
position and initially offered external support to the GERB-led government in 2017. It gained 3.6% in 





Populism has largely played a secondary role in Croatia’s party duopoly between the Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Social Democratic Party. Much of these parties’ dominance was 
however challenged by the rise of the Bridge of Independent Lists (Most). The moderate right party, 
founded and led by Božo Petrov, was a kingmaker both in the 2015 general election and the snap 
election called in 2016. The party is concerned with good governance and liberal reforms, and while 
it bears an anti-establishment profile, it does not qualify as a fully-fledged case of populism (Grbeša 
and Šalaj 2017).
5
 Croatia has two populist parties represented in parliament: the left-libertarian 
Human Shield (ZZ) and the right-wing Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja 
(HDSSB). Human Shield centres on its leader Ivan Vilibor Sinčić, who ranked third in the 2016 
presidential election. The party has an anti-eviction, anti-globalist, pacifist, and environmentalist 
platform, and advocates referendums on withdrawal from the EU and NATO. ZZ sought alliance 
with the Italian 5 Star Movement at the EU level in the run-up to the 2019 EP election. The party 
scored 5.7% and returned one MEP, Sinčić himself. The Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia 
and Baranja is now a marginal party that failed to gain representation in the 2019 EP election. It is a 
case of regionalist populism, founded and led by convicted war criminal Branimir Glavaš (Kukec 
2020). The party emerged in 2006 following Glavaš’s ousting from the HDZ and defines itself as 
liberal and pro-EU. It opposes the corruption and political mismanagements of the central 







 The PopuList (Rooduijn et al. 2019) classifies Most as populist in its latest version. 
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Citizens’ Alliance (SP) qualifies as Cyprus’ only populist party. Citizens’ Alliance presents itself as 
‘post-ideological’ and puts at the heart of its vision Cyprus and its citizens. The party is primarily 
concerned with the peaceful resolution of the Cypriot question, aiming at the withdrawal of the 
Turkish army from the island as the only prospect for the security and prosperity of all ethnicities in a 
common homeland. Its founder, Giorgos Lillikas, has been involved in Cypriot politics for several 
years within the ranks of the radical left Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL); he served as 
Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism as well as Minister of Foreign Affairs; and then ran as 
independent presidential candidate in 2013. Citizens’ Alliance scored 3.3% of the vote at the 2019 EP 





Accusations of ‘democratic backsliding’ in Central-Eastern Europe are also increasingly centring on 
the path undertaken by Czechia (Hanley and Vachudova 2018). The main party seen as responsible 
for this in the country is the Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO) of Andrej Babiš, who has led a 
minority government since 2017, and in coalition with the moderate-left Czech Social Democratic 
Party since 2018. ANO is an anti-establishment pro-business party that gained 21.2% of the vote in 
the 2019 EP election. Babiš, a billionaire and former businessman, has run the country ‘as a firm’, 
hence preferring decisionism over deliberation: ‘Babiš has effectively reduced politics to a 
technocratic exercise on behalf of the people’ (Buštíková and Guasti 2019: 318). ANO’s leader 
recently faced investigations of fraud and misuse of millions in EU funds. Throughout 2019, people 
took the streets in huge numbers urging Babiš to resign. These have been the largest demonstrations 
held in the country since 1989. Babiš’s party is member of the liberal group Renew Europe in the EP. 
Czechia also has a populist radical right party with Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD), which 
scored 9.1% in the EP election. Freedom and Direct Democracy is led by Czech-Japanese 
entrepreneur Tomio Okamura and is a vocal anti-immigrant party, especially concerning immigration 
from Muslim countries. The party advocates greater use of direct democracy, among other things on 
continued EU membership – a reason for which SPD qualifies as hard Eurosceptic. Freedom and 





The Danish People’s Party (DF) is a long-standing populist radical right party. It is integral part of the 
Danish party system having formed in 1995 as a breakaway from the Progress Party, which originally 
developed as an anti-tax party. Its agenda has combined opposition to immigration, including latterly 
an anti-Islam position, with soft Euroscepticism, but it does not endorse the free market as it in 
principle opposes tax cuts. The party started 2019 in a strong position, providing external support to 
the minority Liberal-Conservative coalition government. As a result, it had, in the words of Kosiara-
Pedersen (2020: 1012), ‘left more than light footprints on government policies’ with respect to 
immigration, integration, and economic policies. The EP election in May 2019 was followed quickly 
by the national election. The Danish People’s Party gained 10.8% in the first and only 8.7% in the 
latter held in June. These results came down to a massive drop from the 21% the party achieved in 
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2015. This was despite the prominence of immigration as an issue in the elections. The Danish 
People’s Party is member of the Identity and Democracy group in the EP. A new virulently ethnic 
nationalist party, called Hard Line (SK), clearly ate into its vote in the national election as did the 
move of the Social Democratic Party to a harder line immigration stance. Hard Line is essentially 
based around its leader Rasmus Paludan and is an anti-Islamic ultranationalist party, and only 
borderline populist. The New Right (NB) is a relatively new populist party, formed in 2015 and led 
by Pernille Vermund, a disillusioned Conservative Party member. The party also pulled votes from 
the Danish People’s Party, though from a more liberal economic position, a harder line on 






The Conservative People’s Party (EKRE) has enjoyed growing popularity since 2015. The year 2019 
was particularly rewarding at the electoral level: EKRE first scored 17.8% of the vote in the March 
general election and then 12.7% in the EP election in May. The party was invited to join the 
government led by Jüri Ratas (Centre Party) alongside the rightist Isamaa (‘Fatherland’), gaining 
control of seven ministerial posts. EKRE party leader Mart Helme is Minister of the Interior and his 
son, Martin Helme, Minister of Finance. EKRE stems from the merger of the agrarian People’s 
Union of Estonia and the pressure group Estonian Patriotic Movement, and qualifies as a socially 
conservative ethnonationalist populist party, with a pronounced anti-cosmopolitan, anti-immigrant, 
and anti-Russian profile, and a soft-Eurosceptic agenda (Braghiroli and Petsinis 2019). In the EP, the 
party is affiliated to the Identity and Democracy group and transnationally with two other far-right 





France has had one of the longest and most durable populist parties in the form of the National Rally 
(RN, formerly National Front). Marine Le Pen’s leadership has shifted the position of the party under 
its former leader Jean-Marie Le Pen in an attempt to soften the edges of its hard-line position on 
immigration, but remains a party that contests and mobilises on immigration, law and order, and 
national identity (Shields 2013). The National Rally has had a sustained soft-Eurosceptic position and 
is one of the main drivers behind the Identity and Democracy group in the EP. In the 2019 EP 
election, the party received the highest share of the vote with 23.3% and this built on Le Pen’s success 
at securing the second round of the 2017 presidential election, where she was beaten by Emmanuel 
Macron. The party has effectively become the main party of opposition to Macron’s En Marche. On 
the left, the party of Jean-Luc Mélenchon, La France Insoumise (‘Unbowed France’, LFI) continues 
Mélenchon’s radical left positioning, but combines this with a disdain for the governing ‘caste’ of 
French politics and calling for a sixth republic with popular sovereignty as the guiding principle. He is 
critical of the EU’s economic liberalism and the challenge it poses to French sovereignty, but does not 
call for withdrawal and is therefore soft Eurosceptic. 2019 has seen the party riven with internal 
conflict and with a clear loss of direction. LFI gained 6.3% in the 2019 EP election and sits with the 
European United Left in the EP. A final populist party drawing on the Gaullist tradition is the 
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moderate right Debout La France (‘France Arise’, DLF), which is effectively the vehicle for Nicolas 
Dupont-Aignan. DLF emphasises direct democracy and the need for political reform, and takes a 
soft-Eurosceptic position. The party has only one national representative and scored 3.5% of the vote 
in the 2019 EP election. With the rise of the gilets jaunes, France appears to be a country awash with 






Finnish populism is epitomised by the Finns Party (PS) – previously True Finns and successor to the 
Rural Party. In recent years, the party had both experienced government participation with its former 
leader Timo Soini becoming the Foreign Minister, and a split in 2017 when 20 MPs left to form what 
became Blue Reform (SIN). The Finns have long maintained an anti-establishment stance and have 
been characterised as a populist radical right party, but with more muted xenophobia than other 
parties in that family (Arter 2010). The Finns’ long-standing leader Timo Soini was replaced in 2017 
by Jussi Halla-aho who took a harder line on immigration. The Finns left the government coalition 
that they had taken part in since the 2015 parliamentary election, while Blue Reform remained an 
important governmental player until 2019. In the 2019 general election held in April, the Finns 
campaigned on opposition to the mainstream, and particularly on issues of immigration and climate 
change. As result, the Finns returned to their pre-split levels of support with 17.5%, while Blue 
Reform collapsed with less than 1% of the vote (Arter 2020). In the 2019 EP election, the position 
seemed to be consolidated with the Finns gaining 13.8% and Blue Reform 0.3%. The Finns sit in the 





Germany has two parties that can be considered populist. On the right, the Alternative for Germany 
(AfD) has emerged as a radical right party. The party began in 2013 as an anti-Euro party but was 
soon transformed into an anti-establishment and anti-immigrant soft-Eurosceptic party (Arzheimer 
2015; Olsen 2018). AfD scored 11% of the vote in the 2019 EP election and is member of the 
Identity and Democracy group. On other side of the political spectrum, Die Linke (‘The Left’) grew 
out of the communist successor party and has established itself as a party with a populist ideology 
(Hough and Koss 2009). It is suspicious of globalisation and critical of the existing form of democracy 
arguing for more direct democracy (Olsen 2018). The party gained 5.5% in the 2019 EP election. 
The party is member of the European United Left group. 2019 saw the party gain power in the 
eastern state of Thuringia where, for the first time, it won the highest share of the vote in any German 
state. The subsequent election of the minister president saw Thomas Kemmerich (Free Democratic 
Party) designated with the support of the Christian Democrats and the AfD. The support of the AfD 
caused a national political storm and the ire of Chancellor Angela Merkel; as a result, Die Linke 






The Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) is one of the key populist parties of the past decade, and 
certainly the most prominent and successful among those of the left. SYRIZA rose from the ashes of 
crisis-riven Greece in the early 2010s after years of electoral marginality and ran a government 
coalition with the Independent Greeks (ANEL) through two consecutive mandates between 2015 and 
2019. The party led by Alexis Tsipras is a textbook example of democratic socialism combined with 
populism, whereby ‘the people’ replaced ‘the working class’ in its discourse (Mudde 2004). SYRIZA 
stands for labour rights and the welfare state, social justice, democracy, diversity, and environmental 
protection. While starting from radical left and fairly Eurosceptic positions, the party moderated 
under the mounting pressure of government responsibility and the burden of the memorandums of 
understanding with the Troika (Vasilopoulou 2018). SYRIZA can now be defined as a left-wing 
populist party with soft-Eurosceptic traits: it supports EU membership, but strives to revert its 
excessive economic liberal and technocratic character. SYRIZA’s compromise eventually led Greece 
out of the memorandums in August 2018, but cost it defeat to the right-wing New Democracy in the 
2019 European and general elections, where Tsipras’ party scored respectively 23.8% and 31.5% of 
the vote. The party belongs to the European United Left group. SYRIZA’s unusual partner in 
government was the radical right ANEL, a nationalist and social conservative party with anti-
immigration positions. The two parties effectively converged on their criticism of the EU and a 
common rejection of loan agreement terms with the Troika. ANEL pulled out of the governing 
coalition in January 2019 upon the Greek government resolution of the Macedonia naming dispute. 
ANEL gained 0.8% in the 2019 EP election and did not participate in the general election held in 
July. The radical left European Realistic Disobedience Front (MeRA25) is also linked to the broader 
anti-austerity movement, and was founded in 2018 by former SYRIZA MP and Finance Minister 
Yanis Varoufakis. MeRA25 presents itself as a progressive and responsible alternative to debt and 
bankruptcy. Varoufakis’ party proposes, among other things, to restructure public debt, abolish 
austerity, reduce tax rates, and support creative entrepreneurship. While its members have criticised 
Greek Eurozone membership, they would rather pursue their policy goals within the Eurozone than 
outside of it, hence qualifying as soft Eurosceptic. MeRA25 barely missed the 3% threshold in the EP 
election and gained 3.4% of votes in the general election. Another new party that attained 
representation in 2019 is the radical right Greek Solution (EL), which scored 4.2% and 3.7% of the 
vote, respectively in the EP and national elections. EL was founded in 2016 and is a splinter of the 
populist radical right Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), with which it shares nationalist, anti-
immigrant, and clericalist views. The party is opposed to Greek Eurozone membership and qualifies 





Over the past decade, Hungarian politics has been dominated by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and 
the populist powerhouse Fidesz (alongside its satellite Christian Democratic People’s Party, KDNP).
6
 
Fidesz’s landslide victories in the last three general elections translated into parliamentary 
supermajorities that gave Orbán ample room for manoeuvre to set Hungary on an illiberal-
democratic track. The party gained 52.6% of the vote in the 2019 EP election. After 2010, Fidesz 
 
6
 The PopuList (Rooduijn et al. 2019) treats the two parties separately. 
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decidedly veered towards the far-right end of the ideological spectrum in an attempt to woo voters of 
the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) (Pirro 2015). Orbán largely succeeded in his endeavour, 
in no small part thanks to the politicisation of ‘anti-immigration’ at the peak of the 2015 ‘migration 
crisis’. His nativist populist government continues to wage war against internal and external enemies 
(i.e. liberals and progressives, Soros, migrants, the EU), in no small part thanks the complacency of 
the European People’s Party – Fidesz’s party group in the EP.
7
 From main (radical right) opposition 
force, Jobbik embarked on a moderation trajectory in the mid-2010s (Pirro et al. 2021) and is 
presenting itself as a conservative people’s party. The party so far paid a double toll for this strategy. 
Not only it failed to (substantially) improve its electoral performance in 2018, but also lost several 
votes in the 2019 EP election, where it scored 6.3% of the vote. While preserving a nativist outlook, 
the party has lost much of its radical aura and is now teaming up with other liberal opposition parties 
to defeat Fidesz at the local and national levels. One of the by-products of Jobbik’s moderation was 
the ousting of its most radical members. Our Homeland Movement (MHM) was formed in response 
to these developments in 2018 with the idea of upholding the original radical right ideas that brought 
Jobbik to prominence. Outgoing members of Jobbik, which are now part of MHM, have been 
represented in the Hungarian parliament after the recent split. MHM scored marginal results at the 





The Republic of Ireland has long been one of the few countries without significant populist parties 
and notable as such (O’Malley 2008; O’Malley and Fitzgibbon 2015; Pappas and Kriesi 2015). This is 
particularly remarkable in recent years given the profound impact of the Euro crisis on both the Irish 
economy and Irish politics. The 2011 election saw the meltdown of the traditionally dominant parties 
of Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil, but there was no populist party filling the vacuum with independents 
taking up the slack (Bowler et al. 2017). Sinn Féin is sometimes characterised as a populist party.
8
 
However as a Republican and left party in both Northern Ireland and the Republic, it has 
experienced important changes in recent years. The peace process since 1998 brought the party into 
both power-sharing in Northern Ireland and a steadily growing share of the vote in the Republic. And 
with the accession of Mary-Lou MacDonald as leader of the party in 2018, it has become less 
associated with Republicanism and more squarely associated as a left party with an agenda of housing, 





Italy presents multiple cases of populism (Verbeek and Zaslove 2016) with four contemporary 
parties.
9
 The oldest party still represented in the Italian parliament is the Lega (‘League’, formerly 
Northern League), a radical right party that gained 34.3% of the vote in the 2019 EP election and 
joined forces with the 5 Star Movement (M5S) to form a government in the aftermath of the 2018 
general election. Having turned into the most popular force in Italy, Lega’s leader Matteo Salvini tried 
 
7
 Fidesz’s group membership was suspended in March 2019. 
8
 The PopuList (Rooduijn et al. 2019) classes Sinn Féin as populist. 
9
 The PopuList (Rooduijn et al. 2019) also includes Italian Left. 
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to instigate a snap election in the summer of 2019. The M5S instead opted to work with the 
Democratic Party and other left-wing parties to remain in government. Under the leadership of 
Salvini, the Lega cemented its nativist and populist profile, placing emphasis on being anti-
immigration and Eurosceptic, but now from the angle of a fully-fledged national force (Albertazzi et 
al. 2018; Pirro and van Kessel 2018). The Lega is one of the driving forces of the Identity and 
Democracy group in the EP. The ideologically ambiguous M5S (Pirro 2018) paid the biggest price for 
joining government – and doing so with a party like the Lega. This is demonstrated by the dramatic 
drop in support in the 2019 EP election (17.1%). Despite being the senior coalition partner, the M5S 
appeared often outmanoeuvred by the Lega, which displayed more political experience and a clearer 
agenda. The approval of M5S’s trademark policy proposal – the citizens’ income scheme – did not 
win votes in the election. The moderate right Forza Italia (FI) of former Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi proved a remarkably resilient populist party over the years. The party seems however set 
on a path of electoral decline, as showed by the performance in the EP election (8.8%), in light of 
Lega’s rise to prominence as the main party of the (populist) right bloc. Forza Italia progressively 
moved from economic liberalism to endorsement of a ‘social market economy’ (Albertazzi and 
McDonnell 2015: 27), only sporadically diverging from its pro-EU profile. Throughout 2019, 
Berlusconi’s party maintained a confrontational stance towards the M5S. Forza Italia is member of 
the European People’s Party. The final party in the populist category is the radical right Brothers of 
Italy (FdI), which is slowly but steadily improving its electoral showing. The party gained 6.4% of the 
vote in the 2019 EP election. Leader Giorgia Meloni has thrived on her media savviness and the 
combination of the traditional national-conservative agenda of the Italian (far) right – de facto drawing 
on the legacy and personnel of the Italian Social Movement and National Alliance – and the anti-
immigration and Eurosceptic stance of the Lega. Meloni unsurprisingly works in close alliance with 
Salvini, but places greater emphasis on moral issues. FdI sits with the European Conservatives and 





The Latvian party system has recently experienced moderate-to-significant swings in the fortunes of its 
populist parties. The anti-establishment, economic liberal, and soft-Eurosceptic newcomer Who 
Owns the State? (KPV LV) was founded in 2016 by actor and radio host Artuss Kaimiņš. The 
moderate right party fared particularly well in the 2018 general election, where it came second with 
14.3% of the votes. Who Owns the State? then formed a government coalition with the liberal-
conservative New Conservative Party and New Unity, the populist radical right National Alliance 
(NA) as well as the liberal Development/For!. Who Owns the State? has been since afflicted by 
infighting and, among several high-profile departures and expulsions (including Kaimiņš’s), is now on 
the verge of dissolution. This should explain the party’s poor performance in the EP election, where 
it scored a meagre 0.9%. The other populist party, National Alliance, is on a much better footing.
10
 
The party has been part of government coalitions since 2011 and has gained 16.4% of the votes in the 
2019 EP election. National Alliance stems from the merger of the far-right All for Latvia! and the 
national-conservative For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK, and qualifies as an ethnonationalist and 
Eurosceptic party that opposes immigration and multiculturalism (Braghiroli and Petsinis 2019). The 
 
10
 The PopuList (Rooduijn et al. 2019) does not include National Alliance. 
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party is member of the European Conservatives and Reformists group in the EP and also a signatory 
of the Bauska Declaration, a strategic document for transnational cooperation with the Estonian 
Conservative People’s Party and the Lithuanian Nationalists, in which they affirm their common 





Three populist parties are represented in the Lithuanian parliament. The first is the Labour Party 
(DP) of entrepreneur and billionaire Viktor Uspaskich, which is a centrist force concerned with 
economic, social, health, and cultural development. It particularly seeks to develop a strong middle 
class and make sure that the free market works for the common good of Lithuania. The DP aspires 
to bring together and elect honest, principled, and hard-working people, and create a system of MP 
recall to make them accountable. The DP gained 8.5% of the vote at the 2019 EP election and is 
member of the Renew Europe group. The second populist party is the Lithuanian Centre Party 
(LCP), a soft-Eurosceptic centrist force motivated by the common sense and good will of the 
Lithuanian nation, which strives to guarantee individual and societal freedoms through the emphasis 
on work and wealth. The LCP favours localism over globalism, and thus emphasises national interests 
and identity over European ones. The party gained 5.1% of the vote at the 2019 EP election but did 
not gain any seats. The third populist party is Order and Justice (TT), which is a nationalist and social 
conservative radical right force. TT places at the heart of its programmatic vision a Lithuanian revival, 
to be attained economically through the promotion of industry, innovation, and agriculture; and 
culturally, through education and family policies. The party stands for national sovereignty and values, 
which leads it to oppose immigration and migrant quotas, and to reject the idea of a federal EU. TT’s 
fate has been tightly linked to former chairman and Lithuanian president Rolandas Paksas, despite his 
impeachment in 2004 and eventual resignation from party leadership in 2016. TT experienced a 






The Alternative Democracy Reform Party (ADR) is the only populist party in Luxembourg. It began 
as a party campaigning on pension equality between private and public sectors, and has evolved into a 
right-wing soft-Eurosceptic party. It uses anti-establishment positions related to migration and the 
economy, and proposes more use of direct democracy. In the EP election in 2019, the party gained 





Malta has no substantial populist parties. The only party with populist credential is the radical right 
Maltese Patriots Movement (MPM) which is opposed to Islam, multiculturalism, and immigration, 






The Dutch party system has witnessed a number of influential populist radical right parties since the 
breakthrough of the List Pim Fortuyn in 2002. In this sense, the 2019 EP election was characterised 
by the poor performance of Geert Wilder’s Party for Freedom (PVV) and the rise of Thierry 
Baudet’s Forum for Democracy (FvD). In this election, the two parties scored 3.5% and 11% of the 
vote, respectively. Wilder’s hard line on Islam and endorsement of a Dutch withdrawal from the EU 
are well documented (van Kessel 2015; Pirro and van Kessel 2018; van Kessel et al. 2020). While 
starting from relatively similar ideological premises, the Forum for Democracy denounces a more 
general influx of immigrants and the reluctance of the ‘party cartel’ to address the issue; the Party for 
Freedom, on the other hand, was singularly focused on Islam. At the same time, both parties moved 
away from hard-Eurosceptic positions, but the Forum for Democracy seemed recently willing to 
reconsider the ‘Nexit’ option until ‘Brexit’ is complete and its consequences are properly assessed. As 
far as European issues are concerned, the Forum for Democracy prioritises withdrawal from the 
Eurozone and the restoration of internal border checks. The party sits with the European 
Conservatives and Reformists group in the EP. Ultimately, the Forum for Democracy has been able 
to capitalise on better educated and economically right-wing voters (Otjes 2020).  On the other side of 
the ideological spectrum, we find the radical left Socialist Party (SP), which has also experienced a 
setback in the EP election, gaining just 3.4% of the votes and no seats. The party presents a 
democratic socialist profile and is critical of privatisation and globalisation. The Socialist Party 
qualifies as soft Eurosceptic as it attributes an excessively undemocratic and neoliberal character to 





The Progress Party (FrP) is a long-standing populist party in Norway. It was formed in 1973 as an 
anti-tax party and has been through many subsequent changes. While becoming one of the major 
parties in the Norwegian party system, it has remained a right-wing populist party in that its anti-
establishment orientation has now become embedded in its anti-immigration position. The party has 
sustained a position of ambiguity on European integration as it has always mixed both pro-EU and 
Eurosceptic positions (Sitter 2008: 338). Its ideology is ‘a rather erratic mixture of neo-liberalism, 
conservatism and populism’ (Hagelund 2003: 47), and the party is less definitively on the radical right 
than parties elsewhere.  The party came into power for the first time as a junior partner in the 
coalition government 2013-2017 with the Conservative Party and maintained its place in government 
as part of a broader moderate right coalition as a result of the 2017 election where it attained 15.2% of 





Law and Justice (PiS) is led by Jarosław Kaczyński and has been at the forefront of Polish politics for 
almost two decades. Since 2015, the party has ruled the country on the basis of a nativist populist 
platform with strong conservative positions emphasising traditional values and frequently attacking the 
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judiciary and liberal civil society (Szczerbiak 2017; Bill and Stanley 2020). In 2019, Kaczyński’s party 
significantly improved its performance at the May EP election (45.4%) and in the national election 
held later in October with 43.6%. However, despite an increased share of votes compared to 2015, 
the party lost its majority in the Senate due to a lower portion of wasted votes. PiS is member of the 
European Conservatives and Reformists group in the EP. The other populist party is Kukiz’15, which 
centres on the former musician Paweł Kukiz. The party scored 3.7% in the 2019 EP election and ran 
as part of the moderate Polish Coalition (KP) in the following general election. KP gained 8.55% of 
the votes and Kukiz’15 overall returned six MPs. While starting out from far-right positions (at least, 
in light of the alliances with a series of far-right parties), Kukiz’15 has progressively moved towards 
milder socially conservative and economic liberal positions. Throughout his political history, Kukiz 
has focused his anti-establishment agenda on direct democracy and the reform of the electoral system, 





Portugal had been one of the negative cases of populism in Europe with very little evidence of parties 
being populist (Salgado 2019; Lisi and Borghetto 2018). A new party, Chega! (‘Enough!’), was formed 
in 2019 under the leadership of André Ventura, a former member of the moderate right Social 
Democratic Party (Mendes and Dennison 2020). The ideology is radical right with an anti-
bureaucracy and anti-tax agenda, also combined with nationalism and populism. The party is soft 
Eurosceptic: it stands for a Europe of the peoples and nations, but rejects any dilution of European 
identity. Chega! contested the 2019 EP election as part of the Basta! coalition which secured 1.5% of 
the vote but won no seats. In October 2019, national elections were held, which resulted in a Socialist 





There are no populist parties represented in the Romanian parliament in 2019. The short-lived but 
relatively successful People’s Party – Dan Dionescu (PP-DD) dissolved after its leader was convicted 
for extortion in 2015. The trial had been ongoing since 2013 and Dionescu was released early in 
November 2017. The populist radical right Greater Romania Party (PRM) has lingered at the margins 
of Romanian party system since the 2000s, and has continued to operate after the death of long-
standing leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor in 2015. Between 2017 and 2019, his daughter Lidia tried to 
revive the legacy of his father acting as President of the party’s National Council, but left in dissent 





The Slovak party system has a number of relevant populist parties. The first in order of importance is 
Robert Fico’s Direction-Social Democracy (Smer-SD), which has dominated Slovak politics since 
2006 and held government duties since 2012. Fico’s party presents itself as a modern social-
democratic and pro-EU force, but effectively flirted with nativism in several occasions, either to make 
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concessions to its radical right coalition partner Slovak National Party (SNS) (Pirro 2015) or align with 
the anti-immigration stance of other governments of the Visegrád Group.  The last government (2016-
2020) was a coalition between Smer-SD, the radical right SNS, the ethno-liberal Most-Híd (‘Bridge’), 
and the moderate right Sieť (‘Network’). The murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his 
fiancée on 21 February 2018 deeply affected the course of government. Kuciak had been working on 
cases of tax fraud and misuse of EU funds, and ultimately connected operations of the Italian mob 
(‘ndrangheta) in Slovakia with top-level politicians of the ruling Smer-SD and Most-Híd. The issue of 
anti-corruption dominated the 2019 presidential and EP elections, resulting in a clear setback for 
Smer-SD and affiliated parties. Smer-SD returned 15.7% of the votes in the 2019 EP election – a 
result that has to be also related to increased turnout – coming second to the liberal coalition 
comprising Progressive Slovakia of President Zuzana Čaputová and SPOLU (‘Together’), which 
scored 20.1%. Smer-SD is member of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the EP. 
The right-wing Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) of Igor Matovič had played 
a somewhat secondary role until then (5.3% in the 2019 EP election), but consistently stressed its 
outsider anti-establishment role. The social conservative party vows to root out corruption from the 
country and, while it opposes migrant relocation quotas from the EU, it is not Eurosceptic. OĽaNO is 
member of the European People’s Party. Another populist party is the radical right We Are Family 
(SR). The party scored 3.2% in the 2019 EP election but fared much better in the 2016 general 
election, when it gained 6.6% of the votes and 11 MPs. We Are Family is led by businessman Boris 
Kollár and is strongly committed to family policies, which are paired with anti-immigration and soft-
Eurosceptic views. Squeezed by other competitors on the far-right end of the ideological spectrum 
(We Are Family and the extreme-right Kotleba’s People’s Party Our Slovakia) and tainted by 






Four populist parties are currently represented in the Slovenian parliament. The once-moderate 
Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) currently qualifies as a populist radical right party. The party, led 
by Janez Janša since 1993, is a national and social conservative force committed to the free market. 
The SDS opposes ‘left-sponsored’ immigration, ‘false solidarity’, and multiculturalism, listing among 
those parties who opposed EU migration quotas at the peak of the ‘migration crisis’. The party 
however sees EU and NATO membership fulfilling its foreign policy goals and, while warning about 
the risk of EU disintegration, its stand on the EU resembles more that of other partners in the 
European People’s Party group in the EP than Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s – with 
whom Janša maintains close ties. The party came first in the 2018 general election (24.9%) but was 
not able to form a government. The SDS ran in alliance with the Slovenian People’s Party (SLS) in 
the 2019 EP election, gaining 26.4% of the vote. The List of Marjan Šarec (LMŠ) is a new anti-
establishment reformist party led by the homonymous former comedian and Kamnik mayor. Šarec 
launched the LMŠ after ranking second in the 2017 presidential election, and scored 12.6% of the 
vote in the 2018 general election. His party teamed up with the Social Democrats, the Modern Centre 
Party, the Party of Alenka Bartušek, and the Democratic Party of Pensioners to form a minority 
government after the 2018 election, listing Šarec as Prime Minister. The List of Marjan Šarec is a 
centrist social liberal force advocating reform in different areas (e.g. electoral system, public 
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administration, IT, environment, etc.), pledging to counter political crime and corruption, and stating 
that politics should serve the people and not vice versa. The party gained 15.6% of votes in the 2019 
EP election and is member of the Renew Europe group. Levica (‘Left’) is a populist radical left party 
successor of the United Left alliance. Levica provided external support to the government coalition 
led by Šarec, and gained 6.3% of the vote at the 2019 EP election. The party stands for ecological and 
democratic socialism, advocating sustainability, democratic economy planning, and workplace 
democracy, among other things. Levica defines the EU as an ‘ordoliberal hell’ and envisages an 
alternative plan outside of the Union, but does not actively campaign on Slovenian exit. Finally, the 
populist radical right Slovenian National Party (SNS) is a quite marginal force in Slovenian politics. 
Founded in 1991, and still led by Zmago Jelinčič Plemeniti, the SNS returned 4% of the vote in the 
last EP election. The party advocates withdrawal from the EU and NATO, and thus qualifies as hard 
Eurosceptic. It opposes immigration from Asia and Africa and, as a result, it calls for restrictions on 
foreign labour force. While liberal for what it concerns abortion and religious creed, the SNS firmly 





Long regarded as a case of far-right exceptionalism (Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015), Spain has 
only recently seen the rise of a populist party on the far-right end of the ideological spectrum. After 
returning 4 MEPs in the 2019 EP election (6.2% of votes), the radical right VOX (‘Voice’) improved 
its standing at the snap national election of November 2019, where it gained 15.1% of the vote. The 
party had scored 10.3% in the previous national election held in April 2019. VOX emerged as a split 
from the right-wing People’s Party in 2013 and made its first significant inroads in Andalusia in 2018. 
The party preserves some specificities proper of the Spanish context. On top of its opposition to 
multiculturalism and immigration, VOX indeed stands for the abolition of autonomous communities. 
The party is economically liberal and soft Eurosceptic with regard to Spanish EU membership. In 
line with its traditionalist outlook, it is anti-feminist and firmly rooted in the Catholic heritage of 
Spain. VOX is member of the European Conservatives and Reformists group. On the other side of 
the ideological spectrum, there is the populist left Podemos (‘We Can’). The party contested the 
2019 EP election in alliance with United Left and other parties of the left as Unidas Podemos 
(feminine for ‘United We Can’, UP), gaining 10.1% of the votes.
11
 In the two national elections held 
in 2019, it scored 14.3% and 12.8% of the vote, respectively. Podemos stems from the Spanish 15-M 
movement and draws direct inspiration from the contributions of populism scholar Ernesto Laclau. 
The party is populist anti-establishment with a democratic socialist and libertarian agenda promoting 
equality, environmentalism, and civil rights. After the November 2019 election, UP joined the 
Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party to form a government coalition. Podemos is member of the 







 The PopuList (Rooduijn et al. 2019) presents individual entries for the parties allied with Podemos or surrounding UP 
(A la Valenciana in the Valencian Community, En Común Podem in Catalunya, and Grupo Común da Esquerda in 
Galicia). 
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Sweden has currently one party that can be classed as populist. Sweden Democrats (SD) is a long-
standing party that has come in from the margins of politics in recent years (Widfelt 2008) to grow in 
support and become an important parliamentary force. The party is radical right with a socially 
conservative and nationalist agenda, and strong anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic views. It draws from 
working-class former social-democratic voters (Oskarson and Demker 2015). It was only in January 
2019 that the national election held in September 2018 gave rise to a (Social Democratic Party-led) 
government. The profound difficulties of forming a coalition were in no small part due to the new 
parliamentary arithmetic thrown up by the success of the SD in that election, with 17.5% of the vote 
and 62 parliamentary seats (Aylott and Boln 2019). Many of the difficulties in forming a stable 
coalition stemmed from the divisions between and within parties as to whether any sort of support 
from SD was to be countenanced. In January 2019, SD shifted from a hard- to a soft-Eurosceptic 
position in the light of Brexit and gained 15.3% of the vote in the subsequent EP election. Here, SD 





The largest party in Switzerland is the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), which is a long-standing populist 
radical right party with a strong anti-immigrant agenda and a hard-Eurosceptic position. The nature of 
the Swiss political system effectively guarantees the top five parties membership of government and so 
the SVP has been represented in government (Federal Council) for many years. In 2019, the Swiss 
federal election saw the SVP as the most successful party with 25.6% of the vote but this was seen as a 
setback as the vote share had dropped since the last election in 2015. In office, the party had been 
frustrated in its hard-line efforts to limit immigration as other parties supported a softer position 
designed to sustain Swiss-EU relations (Bernhard 2020). In addition to the SVP, there are two other 
parties that can be considered populist – the Ticino League (Lega) and the Federal Democratic 
Union of Switzerland (EDU). These are relatively small parties that attained 0.8% and 1.0% of the 
vote respectively in the 2019 election. The Lega is a populist regional nationalist party (Albertazzi 
2006) seeing itself as representing the interest of Ticino residents against the Swiss state, and has long 
been hard Eurosceptic (Mazzoleni and Ruzza 2018). The EDU is a right-wing populist party with a 
fundamentalist protestant perspective and a hard-Eurosceptic position. The once-relevant populist 
radical right Geneva Citizens’ Movement (MCG) promotes a leaner state as well as small and medium 
enterprise; it has a tough stance on immigration, and stands for an independent and sovereign 
Switzerland within a confederal Europe (i.e. hard Euroscepticism). In 2019, the party lost its only seat 





In the UK, the two parties that can be characterised as populist in 2019 were the UK Independence 
Party (UKIP) and the Brexit Party.
12
 The Brexit Party was founded and led by Nigel Farage, the 
former leader of UKIP. His departure from UKIP in 2016 had seen the party move to the far right 
and become beset with leadership issues as it went through a succession of leaders in short order after 
 
12
 The PopuList (Rooduijn et al. 2019) does not include the Brexit Party. 
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the referendum. The party had three leaders during 2019, but it was the leadership of Gerard Batten 
that moved the party further to the right with an agenda that fused Brexit with anti-immigration and 
Islamophobic positions, as exemplified by the far-right activists in its ranks and engaging Tommy 
Robinson as an advisor (Klein and Pirro 2020). The party haemorrhaged support to the Brexit Party 
in 2019. The Brexit Party therefore can be seen, in effect, as a continuation of UKIP but with Farage 
being very careful to hold complete control of this party. The Brexit Party fused a right-wing anti-
immigration agenda with hard Euroscepticism. The party had massive success in the 2019 EP 
election, gaining the highest share of the vote with 30.5%, and the largest single party contingent in the 
EP.  The agenda of both these parties in 2019 was, naturally enough, focused on the Brexit issue. But 
the whole of UK politics was dominated by Brexit in 2019, with the May government unable to move 
forward with Brexit and leading to the succession of Boris Johnson as Conservative leader and Prime 
Minister. Johnson’s election gamble in December resulted in the Conservatives receiving a large 
parliamentary majority and the ability to move Brexit through the Commons. The election saw a tiny 
level of support for populist forces with Brexit Party securing 2% and no MPs, while UKIP secured 
only 0.1%. Although there was a sense that the 2019 election saw Johnson pitching his ‘Get Brexit 
done’ agenda as pitting ‘the people’ against parliament, it is overplaying this to see the Conservatives 
under Johnson as populist. The paradox then is that in the UK, 2019 saw the rise and collapse of 
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Portugal Enough!* Chega! 
Radical 
right Soft 1.3 2019 No 1.5 n/a 







right No 11.0 2016 No 5.2 EPP 















right Soft 6.6 2016 No 3.2 n/a 
Slovenia Left Levica 
Radical 
left Soft 9.3 2018 No 6.3 n/a 
 
List of 

















left Soft 12.8 2019 Yes 10.1 
GUE/NG
L 
 VOX VOX 
Radical 




























right Hard 25.6 2019 Yes n/a n/a 








e Party UKIP 
Radical 
right Hard 0.1 2019 No 3.2 n/a 
 
Notes: 
- Bulgaria: The parties marked with an asterisk ran as part of the United Patriots (OP) coalition in 2017, hence 
the same electoral results. In 2019, Ataka was ousted from OP. 
- Cyprus: The Citizens’ Alliance ran in the 2019 EP elections with the Movement of Ecologists. 
- Denmark: The Danish People’s Party provided external support to the minority Liberal-Conservative coalition 
government until June 2019. 
- Finland: Blue Reform, a breakaway of from the Finns Party, maintained ministerial positions that had gained in 
the 2015 election as part of the Finns Party. 
- France: National election results refer to the first round of the 2017 presidential election. 
- Italy: The Lega remained in government with the M5S until August 2019. 
- Poland: Kukiz’15 contested the 2019 general elections as part of the Polish Coalition (KP). 
- Portugal: Chega!’s EP election results are as part of the Basta! coalition. 
- Slovenia: The Slovenian Democratic Party ran with the Slovenian People’s Party (SLS) in the 2019 EP 
elections. 
- Spain: Elections were held twice in 2019. Podemos ran as part of the Unidas Podemos (UP) coalition at the 
national level and joined the government coalition coming out of the November elections. 
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Figure 1.  
Relative electoral strength (within the populist set) in 2019 national elections (or most recent elections 









Note: Non-Inscrits (NI); European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL); Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats (S&D); Renew Europe (Renew); European People’s Party (EPP); European Conservatives and 
Reformists (ECR); Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD); Identity and Democracy (ID). 
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Figure 3. 
Cumulative populist party vote share in 2019 national elections (or most recent elections prior to 





Relative electoral strength (within the populist set) in 2019 national elections (or most recent elections 
prior to 2019), per stance on EU 
 
 
 
